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ASSESSING VERTICAL MARKET RESTRICTIONS:
ANTITRUST RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
TRANSACTION COST APPROACH
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON t
Whether troublesome antitrust issues are posed when vertical
restraints are placed on distributors by manufacturers has long been
disputed. Although economic analysis is needed to assess the rami-
fications of such restraints, this analysis comes in a variety of forms
and does not speak with one voice to these issues. Defective eco-
nomic reasoning predictably leads to results that are inimical to
economic efficiency and sound public policy. Such was the case
when franchise restrictions were held anticompetitive in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.'
This Article develops the argument that failure to make express
allowances for transaction cost considerations is responsible for mis-
taken public policy in this area.2 The transaction cost approach
applies symmetrically both to an assessment of the efficiency gains,
if any, arising from vertical restraints and to an evaluation of the
strategic purposes and effects, if any, that accompany such restraints.
After developing the justifications for, and occasional anticompeti-
tive effects of, vertical market restrictions, I will suggest guidelines
for federal antitrust policy. Part I outlines the general transaction
cost approach and concludes that antitrust enforcement agencies and
the courts should assume that vertical market restrictions are effi-
ciency-enhancing unless certain structural conditions exist within
the industry. Part II discusses strategic behavior and the structural
characteristics of industries needed to support strategic outcomes.
Vertical restraints pose troublesome antitrust issues only when these
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For a discussion of the transaction cost approach, see note 5 infra. The trans-
action cost approach is especially helpful in the context of vertical market relations.
See Phillips, Schwvinn Rules and the "New Economics" of Vertical Relations, 44
AswnruST L.J. 573 (1975) (transaction cost theory is the "New Economics" of
vertical market relations).
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conditions exist. Part III examines the development of American
distribution systems late in the nineteenth century and concludes
that efforts to economize on transaction costs played a central role
in the forward integration of certain manufacturers into distribu-
tion. Part IV applies my economic analysis to the facts and law of
Schwinn and concludes that failure to recognize and make allow-
ances for transaction costs is what led to public policy error. Part
V contrasts the premises of alternative approaches to vertical re-
strictions with those of the transaction cost approach. The legal
principles derivable from the transaction cost approach are sum-
marized in part VI. When evaluated in light of these proposed
legal principles, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.3 can be seen to rest on much
sounder ground than did the Schwinn decision.
I. ECONOMIZING ON TRANSACTION COSTS
A. Background
The relevant unit of economic analysis differs, depending upon
the behavior under examination. When the purpose is to explain
alternative modes of organization, the fundamental unit of analysis
is the transaction.4 Such an approach recognizes that neither firms
nor markets come in predetermined shapes. Rather, both evolve
in active juxtaposition to one another. Strategic purposes aside, the
object of that evolution is to reach a complementary configuration
that economizes on transaction costs.5 This elementary way of
studying economic practices and institutions has only recently been
introduced into antitrust economics.6 Both major and minor errors
of enforcement can be attributed to its previous neglect. Its neglect
has had especially serious consequences in the area of vertical mar-
ket relations.
3433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4 See Commons, Institutional Economics, 21 Am. EcoN. REv. 648 (1931).
5 See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 699, 723 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Economies Defense]. This oversimplifies
somewhat, in that it takes technology as given. Strategic purposes aside, the more
general purpose of economic organization is to devise arrangements that economize
on the sum of production and transaction costs.
The basic tenets of the transaction cost approach are stated succinctly in
Williamson, The Economies of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1442-43 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Transaction Cost Con-
siderations].
6 Transaction Cost Considerations, supra note 5, at 1442-43.
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I have examined the vertical integration of successive produc-
tion stages from a transaction perspective elsewhere.7 The argu-
ment may be summarized in the following conclusions: (1) vertical
integration in production is explained primarily by transaction cost
considerations rather than technological determinancy; 8 (2) al-
though vertical integration commonly yields transaction cost savings,
strategic consequences that pose antitrust concerns occasionally
arise; 9 (3) antitrust enforcement ought to be more discriminating
and restrict its attention to cases in which strategic effects arguably
appear; 10 and (4) although vertical integration serves to overcome
some of the disabilities to which interfirm trading is subject, the
successive integration of additional transactions eventually engenders
operating limitations of its own. 11
This Article deals with vertical market relations between the
production and distribution stages. Each of the conclusions reached
in my study of the vertical integration of production holds true
when the production-distribution nexus is assessed. Some specific
differences should be recognized, however, and it is instructive to
examine the interface between production and distribution on its
own terms. Two novel problems, neither of which is present when
integration occurs in intermediate product markets, arise when a
firm considers forward integration into distribution.
First, final consumers are ordinarily much less well informed
than industrial buyers. Specific efforts to "assist" consumers, some-
times taking the form of product differentiation, may be warranted
and observed on this account. Second, but for vertical restrictions,
distributors' efforts to promote local profitability objectives can
sometimes impair the integrity of the distributorship system. This
is often subsumed under the heading of "free rider" effects, 12 but
the more general phenomenon is that of subgoal pursuit' 3 with
adverse systems consequences.
7 See 0. WILrmmsoN, MARKETS AND HImRACmEs: ANALYSIS AND ANTMIUST
IMPUCATIONS 82-131 (1975); Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations, 61 Am. EcoN. REv. 112 (1971).
8 See 0. W=u=AsoN, supra note 7, at 82-105; Williamson, supra note 7,
at 112-17.
9 See 0. WIuLAMsoN, supra note 7, at 106-16; Williamson, supra note 7,
at 117-19.
10 See 0. WILIAsoN, supra note 7, at 115-16.
"1 See id. 117-31.
12 See note 26 infra.
13 By "subgoal pursuit" I refer to efforts to promote local or individual goals to
the possible detriment of global or system objectives.
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To be sure, subgoal pursuit is responsible for the "ideal" out-
comes attributed to competitive markets. The independent pursuit
of profit by each of the parties is what the proverbial invisible hand
is all about. How is it that competition between a group of dis-
tributors handling a common brand is any less valued than competi-
tion between autonomous firms selling rival brands? If competi-
tion yields social benefits in one context, why not in the other?
The uncritical extension of competitive reasoning from the inter-
firm context to the manufacturer-distributor nexus is doubtlessly
responsible for much of the confusion in the vertical restraints
arena.
After setting out the principal behavioral assumptions upon
which the transaction cost approach is based, I advance the argu-
ment below that organizational innovations normally indicate at-
tempts to realize efficiency gains. This, however, is merely a pre-
sumption: it can be rebutted in individual instances when certain
strategic conditions are shown.14
B. Bounded Rationality and Opportunism
Bounded rationality and opportunism are the central behavioral
assumptions upon which the transaction cost approach is based.
Bounded rationality, which should not be confused with irrational-
ity, refers to a condition in which human agents are "intendedly
rational, but only limitedly so." '. Put differently, it refers to ra-
tionality in the ordinary, dictionary sense of the term-"agreeable to
reason; not absurd, preposterous, extravagant, foolish, fanciful, or
the like; intelligent, sensible" 1-'-rather than in the hyperrational
sense in which it is commonly used in microeconomics textbooks.'
7
Thus, economic agents who are boundedly rational are able to re-
ceive, store, retrieve, and process only a limited amount of informa-
tion. Such agents are routinely overwhelmed by the amount of
information supplied to them in relation to their capacity to use it
effectively. Accordingly, the economics of attention is an important
but generally neglected item on the research agenda.'
8
14 See text accompanying notes 27-31 infra.
15 H. SimoN, A2ma isTav BEHrvxon xxiv (2d ed. 1961).
16WEBsmm's NEw ImTENAnONAL DicnoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
2066 (2d ed. 1959).
17 See Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, Am. EcoN.
REv., May, 1978, at 1, 2-3.
18 See id. 13. Simon argues that attention, i.e., our capacity for considering
and processing a given piece of information, is the scarce resource, not information.
Calling for procedural means of focusing attention in a rational and productive way,
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Opportunism extends the usual motivational assumption of self-
interest to make allowance for self-interest with guile. Thus,
whereas bounded rationality suggests decisionmaking less complex
than the usual assumption of hyperrationality, opportunism sug-
gests calculating behavior more sophisticated than the usual assump-
tion of simple self-interest. Opportunism refers to "making false
or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or promises," 19 cutting
corners for undisclosed personal advantage, covering up tracks, and
the like. Although it is a central assumption, it is not essential
that all economic agents behave this way. What is crucial, how-
ever, is that some agents behave in this fashion and that it is costly
to sort out those who are opportunistic from those who are not.
It has long been recognized that opportunism poses economic
problems in the context of public goods,20 in the trading of informa-
tion,21 and in insurance markets.22 But recognition that oppor-
tunism is a pervasive economic problem has taken much longer to
develop. Peter Diamond observed just seven years ago that the
usual assumption is that economic agents do not lie, cheat, or steal.
Instead, their actions are overt and agreements are binding.23 Reli-
ance upon simple self-interest, however, has been changing. More
recently, Jack Hirshleifer observed that the key question "for the
viability of a pattern of exchange ... is control of cheating," 24 and
he notes that "[in a world where attention is a major scarce resource, information
may be an expensive luxury, for it may turn our attention from what is important to
what is unimportant." Id. Bounded rationality should also be distinguished from
the 'least reasonable man" approach, which some marketing specialists associate
with the Federal Trade Commission's approach to advertising. > See Cunningham &
Cunningham, Standards for Advertising Regulation, J. MArxETiNG, October, 1977,
at 92. The focus of that approach is on "'the public-that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, who in making purchases,
do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general impressions."'
Id. (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910));
see Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944).
To be sure, when the hazards are severe and communication difficult, a cautious
standard such as this has merit. Presumably, however, these are the exceptions
rather than the rule: a reasonable-man standard normally ought to apply.
19 E. GorrmAN, STRATEGIc INTERACTION 105 (1969).
20 See, e.g., Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. EcoN.
& STATISTICS 387 (1954).
21 See, e.g., Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF EcoNoxnc RESEARCH, TnE BATE AND DmEcIoN
OF IhN NTIE Acrnr=: ECONOMIC AND SocYAr FACToRs 609, 614-16 (1962).
22 K. Aimow, EssAYs IN THE THEoRY OF BIsE-BEARING 142 (1971).
2 SDiamond, Comments, 1 FRONTIERS oF QU ANTrATTVE EcoNomIcs 29, 31
(M. Intriligator ed. 1971).
24 Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Standpoint, 20 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27
(1977).
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Steven Salop characterizes the Rational Economic Man as one who
"choose[s] to tell the truth or misrepresent according to the rela-
tive profits of the two strategies, unencumbered by any moral
bounds." 25 This is a remarkable transformation in the brief span
of seven years.
Given both bounded rationality and opportunism, the follow-
ing organizational design problem must be faced by the firm and
recognized by society: the need to organize transactions in such a
way as to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously
safeguarding the transactions in question against opportunism.
What is especially interesting about the production-distribution in-
terface is that the manufacturer is concerned not only with the
bounded rationality of the immediate parties, but with that of the
ultimate consumer as well. Devising transactions that economize
on the information needs of consumers is thus a major considera-
tion. Opportunism is also of concern in two respects. The manu-
facturer is concerned both that the integrity of the distribution
system be protected against free riders2 6 and that the quality of
his product not be debased. Although these are commonly inter-
related, it is useful to address each separately. If hazards of either
kind are observed, vertical market restrictions may be warranted.
C. The Presumption that Vertical Market Restrictions
Normally Enhance Efficiency
A transaction cost analysis applies at each separate stage of
activity in the production and distribution of a good or service.
Whether each separate stage is autonomous or not is unimportant.
In principle, each could be and market contracts could be used to
bring activity at successive interfaces into adjustment. Such a pro-
liferation of contracts can be costly, however. The basic presump-
tion of the transaction cost approach is that successive interfaces are
organized in a manner that economizes on transaction costs. Such
25 S. Salop, Parables of Information Transmission in Markets 6-7 (April, 1978)
(unpublished discussion paper no. 21, Center for the Study of Organizational
Innovation, University of Pennsylvania).
26 An example of a free rider is a retailer who sells a product promoted by
one of his competitors. He benefits from the promotion, but because it has cost
him nothing, he can sell the product at a lower price than the competitor who
promotes it. Territorial restrictions imposed by the manufacturer may prevent this
free riding, thus encouraging retailers to push the manufacturer's product. For a
discussion of the free rider phenomenon in the context of resale price maintenance,
see R. PosNEi, ANTIhUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECnVE 149-50, 160, 185
(1976); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86
(1960).
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an approach is consistent with the common law tradition for assess-
ing economic activity.
27
Antitrust doctrine typically maintains a more skeptical posture.
Given the legal system's reliance on the adversary process, it is not
surprising that a former chief of the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department should observe, "I approach territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but
inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." 28 The major prob-
lem with this orientation, which has been the prevailing one, is that
the contestants have played the enforcement game entirely on the
inhospitability tradition's turf.29 Rather than affirmatively arguing
the case in terms of transaction cost economies, defendants have
mainly argued that there are no ill effects.30 As a consequence of
this preoccupation with (real or imagined) anticompetitive effects,
the affirmative defenses based on the transaction cost economies
underlying many vertical market restrictions have gone undeveloped.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.31 is an example.
I believe that the common law tradition is based on sound
premises and that, confronted with a novel organizational arrange-
ment, the immediate reaction of antitrust enforcement agencies and
the courts should not be to attribute anticompetitive purpose and
27 For some recent views on the presumption of efficiency in the common law,
see Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STMU. 51 (1977);
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEcAL
SrTu. 65 (1977). Richard Posner consistently emphasizes efficiency in his wide-
ranging and influential studies of the law. See, e.g., R. PoSNER, EcoNoMrc
AxALvsis or LAw (1972).
2 SThe quotation is attributed to Donald Turner (at a time when he was
assistant attorney general in charge of the antitrust division) by Stanley Robinson.
1968 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N, ANruRsT LAw SYNvsosmM 29.
29 Robert Bork makes a similar point, noting the significance of a recent shift
in the Supreme Court's orientation in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977):
The present misshapen look of antitrust doctrine is due in large measure
to the Supreme Court's habit of regarding business efficiency as either
irrelevant or harnful . . . . The point is that insufficient regard for
efficient methods of production and distribution meant that hardly any
business practice challenged could survive. The sole benefit the practice
might confer was ruled out of court, and only possible dangers were
considered ...
The Court's Sylvania opinion not only counted efficiencies in favor of
a challenged business practice but did so in a sophisticated way ....
This approach-concern for consumer welfare and an intelligent inquiry
into the efficiency potential of challenged business practices-is capable of
altering the entire corpus of antitrust jurisprudence, which now stands in
considerable need of repair.
Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. BEv. 171, 172 (1978).
3 0 E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
31388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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intent.8 2 Instead, they should inquire whether efficiency gains can
plausibly be associated with the arrangement under consideration.
Only when this exercise has been completed should the issue of anti-
competitive abuse be raised.
The principal reason for maintaining an efficiency presumption
is that this presumption accords with reality. As set out in the fol-
lowing section, anticompetitive effects can appear only if rather
special structural conditions exist. When these are present, vigilance
is warranted. Maintaining a general attitude of inhospitability,
however, encourages the enforcement agencies to behave in a
counterfactual way and interpret innocent and beneficial develop-
ments in a suspect and even hostile manner.
An efficiency presumption is needed to remedy the distortions
that earlier traditions have introduced into the enforcement process.
However, although presumptions reflect central tendencies and pro-
vide framework, they are also subject to challenge. This brings us
to matters of strategic purpose and oligopolistic relations.
II. POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
AND OLIGOPOLISTIC INTERDEPENDENCE
Practices that ordinarily are unobjectionable and indeed argu-
ably are efficient should under some sets of circumstances come
under further scrutiny and perhaps be proscribed. Specifically,
vigilance is warranted in situations in which the behavior in ques-
tion promotes strategic purposes or oligopolistic interdependence.
The distinction between these two effects is this: activities of a
strategic kind serve to disadvantage small rivals and potential en-
trants in circumstances in which actual competition is attenuated;
the creation of oligopolistic interdependence, by contrast, entails
efforts to maintain compliance and avoid mutually disadvantageous
interfirm rivalry among established oligopolists. Thus, whereas
strategic behavior is directed outward, to discipline actual and
potential rivals, oligopolistic interdependence focuses inward, the
concern being rivalry among major, established firms.
A. Strategic Behavior and Impediments to Entry
My discussion of strategic behavior is selective rather than com-
prehensive. It deals only with circumstances in which vertical re-
32 An extreme example of this inventive proclivity to emphasize anticompeti-
tive effects, even to the extent of regarding simple efficiency as an anticompetitive
advantage, is the argument of the Federal Trade Commission in Foremost Dairies,
Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962).
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strictions can serve as impediments to entry. Predatory pricing,
preemptive investment, strategic research and development, and
other types of strategic behavior are neglected-although these are
all members of the same family.
83
1. The Views of Bork and Posner
Robert Bork contends, and I agree, that much antitrust mischief
has resulted from loose use of the phrase "barriers to entry." 34 In
order to avoid continuing abuse, Bork suggests that business prac-
tices hereafter be classified as efficiency enhancing or predatory.35
Provided that allowance is made for the possibility that behavior
that is efficient in one context can be exclusionary when used by
firms with large market shares, I am prepared to accept this ap-
proach. Inasmuch as Bork expressly acknowledges that exclusionary
behavior should be examined in contingent terms,3 6 there would
appear to be no serious conceptual differences between us. Our
views do diverge, however, due to the narrowness with which he
defines exclusionary practices.
Although Bork at one point concedes that a dominant firm can
disadvantage a rival by disrupting optimal distribution patterns,3 7
he develops the case in rather circumscribed terms and thereafter
argues that there is "nothing to the notion that an established firm
might integrate vertically in order deliberately to raise the capital
requirements of entry."3 The "instances of deliberate predation" 39
that expressly concern him are boycotts, 40 individual refusals to
deal,41 and predation through government processes. 42  He believes
that all vertical restraints are unqualifiedly lawful.
43
33 See Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Am. EcoN. REV. - (1979);
Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 B-.r_. J. EcoN. 534
(1977); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284 (1977).
34 R. BoPg, Trm ANTITRUST PARADOX 310 (1978).
351d. 160, 329.
361d. 156-57. Bork cites the exclusive dealing agreement as an example of a
practice that manifests a very weak possibility of predation and a very strong
probability of efficiency. Although his view of the lawfulness of the practice is
clear, it implicitly recognizes the possibility of exceptions. "[T]he law cannot
properly see predatory behavior in all unilaterally enforced changes in patterns of
distribution." Id. 156 (emphasis added).
37 Id. 156-58.
3s Id. 323.
39 Id. 329.
40 Id. 330-44.
41 Id. 344-46.
42 Id. 347-64.
43 Id. 288; Bork, supra note 29, at 173-80, 181-82.
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Richard Posner also cautions against excessive concern with
entry barrier claims. Thus he counsels that "[a] barrier to entry is
commonly used ... to mean anything which a new entrant must
overcome in order to gain a foothold in the market, such as the
capital costs of entering the market on an efficient scale. This is
. . . meaningless . . . since it is obvious that a new entrant must
incur costs to enter the market, just as his predecessors . . . did
previously." 44
2. A Different View
For the reasons set out below, I am not persuaded that capital
market impediments cannot arise because of vertical restraints or
that the cost conditions facing early and later entrants are equal. I
should make clear, however, that my differences with Bork and
Posner arise only in dominant firm industries and, possibly, in col-
lusive oligopolies. In other circumstances, efforts to behave strate-
gically will be self-defeating. Accordingly, concern over strategic
behavior vanishes in industries characterized by neither dominant
firms nor tight oligopolies.
To illustrate that a capital market impediment can arise as a
result of vertical integration, posit an industry with two stages, a
production stage and a distribution stage. Assume that the indus-
try is equally efficient whether or not these stages are integrated.45
In addition, assume that manufacturing (stage I) is monopolized
and that the monopolist has integrated forward into distribution
(stage II). Finally, assume that a potential entrant with experience
in manufacturing, but none in distribution, subsequently develops
a rival product that it can manufacture at a competitive cost. The
question to be addressed is whether this rival is disadvantaged by
the monopolist's earlier decision to integrate.
Assessing this will be facilitated by comparing the conditions
facing the potential entrant under the following nonintegrated and
integrated alternatives:
(1) [T]he monopolistic stage I producer is not integrated,
in which case the prospective new entrant can enter at stage
I only and utilize the facilities of stage II producers . . .
(suitably expanded if necessary), [or] ... (2) the monopolis-
tic stage I producer is integrated into stage II so that either
(a) the new entrant himself comes in at both stages or (b)
44 R. PosNRn, supra note 26, at 59 (emphasis added).
45 It should be noted that vertical integration could be a less efficient mode of
structuring transactions but might be adopted nonetheless because of strategic
incentives.
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independent new entrants appear simultaneously at both
stages. If Bork... [is] correct, the cost of capital ought to
be independent of these conditions.
To contend that the terms of finance are the same
under 2(a) as they are under I implies that the capital mar-
ket has equal confidence in the new entrant's qualifica-
tions to perform stage II activities as it does in firms that
are already experienced in the business. Except in cir-
cumstances where experienced firms are plainly inept, this
is tantamount to saying that experience counts for nought.
This, however, is implausible for transactions that involve
large, discrete rather than small, but recurring commit-
ments of funds. Although transactions of the latter type
can be monitored reasonably effectively, on the basis of
ex post experience, this is much less easy for transactions of
the large, discrete variety-which are the kind under con-
sideration here. Reputation, which is to say prior experi-
ence, is of special importance in establishing the terms of
finance for transactions that involve large, discrete commit-
ments of funds.
46
The problems are worse, moreover, if the 2(b) scenario un-
folds. As compared with condition 1, would-be stage II entrants
are presumably penalized both for lack of experience and because
nonconvergent expectations 47 pose more serious problems in the
2(b) context. The latter argument is that the flexible or expanded
capacity of existing stage II processors can accommodate new entry
at stage I much more easily than if simultaneous new entry by in-
dependent distributors at stage II is required. Problems with inter-
dependent investments by new independent entities arise because
of differing perceptions of the market, incentive differences, and
because interfirm intentions may be difficult to signal. These
hazards are presumably reflected in the cost of capital. As a conse-
quence, neither of the type 2 scenarios is on a parity with the type
1 condition. Bork's unrestricted claim that vertical integration
46 0. WILLAMsoN, supra note 7, at 111.
47 Firms' expectations converge, creating equilibrium in a market as a whole,
when every firm bases its expectations on the same set of events and signals, and
comes to the same conclusions. Whether or not such market equilibrium can be
achieved depends on several factors, among them the degree of interdependence
among the firms, the level of certainty about the future, the number of variables to
be considered, the capacity of firms to adapt to change, and the amount of infor-
mation available to the firms. See Malmgren, Information, Expectations and the
Theory of the Firm, 75 QJ. EcoN. 399, 405-11 (1961); Williamson, supra note 7,
at 120.
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cannot influence the cost of capital, and hence the conditions to
entry, is evidently overstated.48
Consider now the cost issue that Posner addresses. As he puts
it, the issue appears to be whether early entrants are somehow able
to avoid costs that later entrants incur. He claims they are not,
with which contention I agree. But this does not reach the question
whether timing differences can give rise to differential cost bearing
consequences. This is related to, but goes beyond, the matter of
differential capital costs discussed above.
Whether potential entrants will be disadvantaged by prior in-
tegration depends on (1) the importance of learning-by-doing, (2)
the degree to which learning-by-doing economies are shared by
employer and employee, (3) the ease with which specialized human
assets can be bid away, and (4) the degree to which prices track
costs.49 Assuming that prices track the current costs of the least-
cost supplier in a fairly regular way and that it is difficult to bid
specialized human assets away from current employers in effective
team configurations, potential entrants will be more severely dis-
advantaged by prior integration the more important that learning-
by-doing economies are and the less completely these learning eco-
nomies are appropriated by employees.
The upshot is that decisions to integrate into activities that
require investments in idiosyncratic human or physical assets can
affect the subsequent ease of entry. Whether the argument has anti-
trust significance, however, depends on the circumstances. For one
thing, the conditions of entry are relatively unimportant if actual
competition is already effective. Even where this is problematical,
an additional entry impediment because of integration can be said
to exist only to the extent that access through established distribu-
tion channels is impracticable. This, in turn, depends on the size
of the residual (nonintegrated) market and on whether sales through
the distribution channels of integrated firms are realistic. The
subset of industries warranting close antitrust scrutiny, from both
actual competition and market access points of view, reduces to
industries characterized by dominant firms and tight oligopolies that
have comprehensively integrated into distribution.
Even here, the question whether forward integration or vertical
restrictions yield net benefits should be addressed. Are the benefits
48 See Caves & Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjectural
Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 241, 246-47
(1977) (vertical integration may raise the capital-cost entry barrier).
49 See 0. WmLrAmsomr, supra note 7, at 216-17.
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great or slight in relation to the anti-competitive consequences?'
The results of this inquiry can vary depending on the industry's
stage of development. Thus, economic benefits realized immedi-
ately after the restraint has been effected may not continue in-
definitely. Put differently, although "administered distribution"
may be needed to ensure viability at an early stage in an industry's
development, a more mature industry may be able to support the
requisite distribution system without the same need for restraints
on forward integration. Thus, although forward integration may
represent an effort to realize private gains with resulting economies
at one stage, it may constitute an unneeded restraint at a later stage
and indeed may serve strategically to disadvantage rivals if it is
continued.
Although the above argument is primarily couched in terms of
vertical integration, I also refer to vertical restrictions. The scope
of the latter term should be qualified. Among exclusive dealing,
territorial restrictions, and customer restrictions, only the first of
these vertical restrictions constitutes a possible entry impediment,
and this only under the special circumstances of structural domi-
nance or tight oligopoly.50
More generally, except as oligopolistic interdependence is pro-
moted,51 I am persuaded by Bork's arguments that territorial and
customer restraints should not be proscribed.52 Manufacturers will
introduce these only as they are expected to attenuate subgoal pur-
suit and promote efficiency.5 3 But what of the possibility that exclu-
sive dealing has objectionable effects other than that of impeding
entry? If it does, under what circumstances do these effects occur
and what are the ramifications for antitrust enforcement?
60 1 have defined a dominant firm industry as one in which the market share
of the largest firm is at least sixty percent and entry into the market is not easy.
Tight oligopoly is less easy to characterize. It is mainly apt to appear in mature,
highly concentrated industries producing homogeneous products under uniform cost
conditions and having significant barriers to entry. The reasons why oligopolistic
interdependence is difficult to sustain in other circumstances is traceable to the
transaction costs of reaching and policing collusive agreements. See generally
0. WILmsoN, supra note 7, at 234-47.
51 See text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
52 See note 40 supra.
53 Preston observes that "customer-territorial restrictions considered alone . . .
do not contribute to the weakening of the interbrand competition in final markets
or serve as barriers to entry." Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements:
Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 L. & CoNTEMm. POB. 506, 520
(1965). Furthermore, "[tihe case against customer-territorial restrictions where
suppliers are profitable or relatively large appears to rest on an association between
these restrictions and parallel limitations on the range of products marketed by a
distributor, ie., exclusive dealing." Id. 520-21 (footnote omitted).
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Suppose that entry is unaffected but that exclusive dealing
benefits some customers (for example, by permitting a product to
be effectively differentiated) but simultaneously disadvantages others.
For instance, comparison shopping is often facilitated by side-by-side
examination; exclusive dealing precludes this. Marginal customers
who wish to establish whether differentiation warrants a price pre-
mium will, if confronted by exclusive dealing, be less able to make
informed judgments easily. How should this be evaluated?
Or suppose that, although the restraint itself negligibly affects
the condition of entry, other factors impede entry and widespread
use of the restraint effectively precludes customers who know that
they place little value on the additional services (which are not
offered separately under exclusive dealing restrictions) from obtain-
ing the product without services included.
Bork meets these types of objections with the argument that
when the "technology of distribution... [does] not allow the pref-
erences of both groups of customers to be met, . . the manufacturer
will choose. to satisfy the larger number," which he regards as the
efficient thing to do.54 Actually, I would expect that manufacturers
would service the more profitable subset-which recent scholarship
discloses commonly will be, but need not be, the larger market.55
More troublesome is the possibility that the use of a profitability
calculus to decide what mix of products to offer may be at variance
with welfare gains, even when the decision is to service the larger
market.
However, inasmuch as such defects in the product mix calculus
are difficult to ascertain in practice and since exclusive dealing does
not obviously bias such choices adversely, it seems prudent to sepa-
rate exclusive dealing restraints from the product variety issue.
Accordingly, except as entry impediments result, a policy of per-
missiveness with respect to exclusive dealing restraints would nor-
mally appear to be warranted.
56
54 Borlk supra note 29, at 181.
55See Dixit & Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity, 67 Am . EcoN. REv. 297 (1977); Spence, Product Differentiation and
Welfare, 66 Am. EcoN. REv. 407 (1976).
56 Note that, directly or indirectly, all of the above issues depend on transaction-
cost considerations. Thus, investors demand a premium to invest in new enterprises
because (1) it is costly to assess the merits of the investment proposal (the relevant
data cannot be displayed and evaluated costlessly) and (2) there are hazards of
opportunism. The idiosyncrasies of human assets also reflect a condition of infor-
mation impactedness in which inexperienced firms are disadvantaged. Comparison
shopping has advantages because the characteristics of rival products cannot be
described adequately in objective terms to allow abstract comparisons to be made.
This is a reflection of bounded rationality. And nonseparable offers of product and
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B. Oligopolistic Interdependence and the
Regularization of Price
Although Posner is unconcerned with strategic (outward-
directed) uses of vertical restrictions, he argues that such restrictions
can be used to strengthen a dealer cartel.57 This is worrisome, how-
ever, only when a "manufacturer ha[s] a very large market share
or . . [when] all or most of the manufacturers in the market im-
posed uniform restrictions on their dealers so that (in either case)
the dealers had a monopoly position in a genuine economic mar-
ket." 58 In all other circumstances, vertical restrictions evidently
pose no antitrust concerns.
Although I agree that the issue of dealer cartels warrants anti-
trust scrutiny, the possibility that vertical restrictions can be used
to consolidate a manufacturer cartel is to me more troublesome.
Thus, even if, contrary to Bork, dealer cartels are not easy anti-
trust enforcement targets,5 9 I question whether dealers are often in
a position to impose restrictive terms on unwilling manufacturers.
When they are not, we can be confident that manufacturers will not
knowingly adopt strategies the effect of which is to transfer money
from their pockets to those of their retailers.60 Observed restric-
tions can thus be assumed to promote manufacturer interests.
The more troublesome possibility to which I refer-that vertical
restrictions can be used to support manufacturer cartels-hinges on
the proposition that regularizing exchange commonly serves to
stabilize frangible associations. A crucial operating concern of a
manufacturers' cartel is to devise signals whereby adherence to the
cartel policy can be inferred with confidence. The elimination of
false moves or ambiguous actions which, if misinterpreted, would
cause the cartel to unravel, is of special importance.
service are made because manufacturers are unable to price-discriminate fully and
cannot rely on customers to reveal true preferences accurately-manifestations of
bounded rationality and opportunism, respectively.
57 Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cn. L. REV. 1, 17 (1977).
58 Id. Posner would use a "rule of reason" approach "to isolate, and condemn,
restrictions that are imposed nominally by the manufacturer but are in fact desired
for monopolistic purposes by dealers using the manufacturer as their enforcement
agent." Id.
59R. Bosm, supra note 34, at 292-93. In disposing of the "dealer cartel
objection" to his proposal that all vertical restraints be held ]awful, Bork argues
not only that dealer cartels are not difficult to uncover, but also that manufacturer-
imposed restraints, affecting only intrabrand competition, are of limited, if any, use
to a dealer cartel. Id.
60 See Bork, supra note 29, at 188.
1979]
968 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The avoidance of pricing ambiguity is especially critical. When
retail outlets are owned or extensively controlled by manufacturers,
retail price changes can normally be assumed to reflect manufac-
turers' intent. By contrast, the responsibility for pricing changes is
less clear where dealers are fully autonomous agents. To the extent
that pricing latitude among such dealers makes it more difficult for
manufacturers to reach cartel agreements because ex ante confidence
in the subsequent execution of agreements is lacking, efforts to re-
move "unwanted" degrees of freedom can be anticipated. The
same is true when, despite agreement, price variability creates sus-
picion that cartel members are defecting, which in turn may cause
the cartel to unravel.
Bork argues that the manufacturer cartel objection to vertical
restrictions is "insubstantial" and "applies only to resale price main-
tenance." 61 I would characterize it somewhat differently. Although
I agree that regularizing price is the main antitrust concern, ver-
tical restraints other than resale price maintenance can be used to
promote pricing discipline. The use of vertical restrictions to
tighten oligopolistic interdependence is likely to be attractive, how-
ever, only in industries with homogenous products.62 It is note-
worthy, moreover, that an economies justification for such restric-
tions is difficult to provide in homogeneous product markets.
Accordingly, the burden of justifying vertical restrictions in homo-
geneous, oligopolistic industries rests heavily on the firms employ-
ing them. The normal efficiency presumption is unwarranted in
such circumstances.
III. ASPECTS OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
Alfred Chandler, Jr.'s recent monograph 63 describing market-
ing developments during the late nineteenth century provides strong
support for the proposition that transaction costs are sufficiently
significant to affect the structure of industries, sometimes motivating
firms to integrate forward from manufacturing into the retail stage.
In the following subsections Chandler's findings concerning effi-
61 R. Bonn, supra note 34, at 294.
62 See Newman, Strategic Groups and the Structure-Performance Relationship,
60 REv. EcoN. & STATiSTICS 417 (1978). For a discussion of the problems asso-
ciated with effecting tight interdependence in oligopoly, see 0. WnLrAMsoN, Supra
note 7, at 234-47.
63 A. CHANDLER, THE VxsmrLE HAND: THE MANAGERLkL PEVOLUTION IN
AmEcAN BusnEss (1977).
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ciency-enhancing and strategic behavior will first be described, then
analyzed from a transaction cost perspective.
A. Efficiency and Forward Integration
1. Chandler's Findings
Chandler's description of forward integration into distribution
by American manufacturers distinguishes between the developments
of infrastructure and the induced distributional response. The
appearance of the railroads and the telegraph and telephone sys-
tems in the latter part of the nineteenth century permitted wider
geographic areas to be served in a reliable and timely way. The
"reliability and speed of the new transportation and communica-
tion" permitted greater economies of scale to be realized in factory
organization.64 These economies of scale at the factory level were
latent-in the sense that the technology was there waiting to be
exploited. Because it is not manufacturing cost but delivered cost
that matters, however, it became profitable to realize these scale
economies only when a low-cost distribution system appeared. That
is, so long as transportation expenses were great, the most efficient
way to serve markets was by dispersing factories.
Once the new transportation and communication infrastruc-
ture was in place, the stage was set for the distributional response.
A crucial question was how to devise a coordinated manufacturing-
distribution response. In principle, both stages could have re-
mained autonomous: manufacturers could have remained special-
ized and built larger-scale plants while specialized distributors could
have responded simultaneously, either on their own initiative or by
contract, by assembling the requisite distribution network. In
many industries, however, "existing marketers were unable to sell
and distribute products in the volume they were produced . ...
Once the inadequacies of existing marketers became clear, manu-
facturers integrated forward into marketing." 65 An administrative
override was evidently needed.66
Not all industries integrated forward, however, and those that
did integrate forward did not do so to the same extent. Some
industries linked manufacturing only with advertising and whole-
saling; retail integration was not attempted. Nondurable indus-
tries that had recently adopted continuous process machinery-
64 Id. 245.
65 Id. 287.
66 For an interesting treatnent of vertical integration forward into distribution
in the sale of gasoline, see D. TEECE, VERTicAL INTEGRATION A,ND VjncAL
DrVEsT-UmE TnE U.S. Om. INDusTRY 40-44 (1976).
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cigarettes, matches, cereals, and canned goods are examples-were
in this category. 7 More ambitious and interesting were producer
and consumer durables that required "specialized marketing serv-
ices-demonstration, installation, consumer credit, after-sales service
and repair," services that existing middlemen "had neither the in-
terest nor facilities to provide." 118 Examples here included sewing
machines, farm machinery, office machines, and heavy electrical
equipment.
2. A Transaction Cost Interpretation
The new transportation and communication infrastructure per-
mitted manufacturers to serve larger markets in a low-cost way.
The ramifications of these infrastructural developments on plant
size are displayed in Figure 1.69
APC
ADC
Q
Key
Average Production Cost
Average Distribution Cost
Output Quantity
/- ATC
__ ATC
APC
Q2* OUTPUT
FIGuRE 1
67 "Such entrepreneurs found that the existing marketers were unable to move
their goods quickly enough or to advertise them effectively enough to keep their
high-volume production facilities operating steadily." A. CiANDrLn, supra note 63,
at 287.
68 Id. 288.
69 F. ScsrEns, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAuFmr, AND R. MusP'HY, Tim EcoNoMIcS
OF MULTPLANT OPERATION: AN INTERNATIONAL CoMPAnIsoN STUDY (1975).
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The APC curve shows the average cost of production as plant size
increases. These average costs decrease over a wide range due to
assumed economies of scale. The curve ADC, shows the original
average distribution cost of delivering products from a plant. This
curve increases throughout because greater sales require marketing
to a larger geographic region. The curve ADC, shows the average
distribution cost after the new infrastructure is put in place. It is
everywhere lower than ADC1, but also rises throughout. ATC,
and ATC, are average total cost curves: these are given by the
vertical summation of APC with ADC, and ADC2, respectively.
Average total costs reach a minimum at Q1* and Q,*, where Q*
is necessarily larger the Q1*, given the stipulated shift in average
distribution costs. An increase in plant scale and the extension of
service to larger geographic markets are thus indicated.
Problems of implementation, however, are not addressed by
this cost curve apparatus. How are the linkages between manufac-
turing and distribution to be forged? They are not created auto-
matically. If existing middlemen respond in a slow and faltering
way to the opportunities that the new transportation and communi-
cation infrastructures afford, the stage is set for someone, in this
instance the manufacturers, to experiment with new organizational
structures.
The issues here are of a transaction cost rather than of a pro-
duction cost kind. Although a definitive analysis of the "inadequa-
cies of existing marketers" 70 reported by Chandler would require
further research, I conjecture that these distributional difficulties
are due to a failure of "convergent expectations" 71 coupled with
the hazards posed by small numbers supply relations between au-
tonomous parties.72  Convergent expectations problems are mainly
attributable to bounded rationality. It was difficult for marketers
who were accustomed to operating in a local market regime to per-
ceive the opportunities that awaited them. And there was no obvi-
ous way to signal these opportunities by relying upon decentralized
pricing.73  Moreover, even if manufacturers and distributors had
both perceived the opportunities that the new transportation and
communication infrastructure afforded, and if each responded in-
70 A. CHAmLm, supra note 63, at 287.
71 See Malmgren, supra note 47, at 405-11.
72 For a discussion of these transaction cost issues, see 0. WUnMAMSoN, supra
note 7, at 86-95.
73 See Malmgren, supra note 47.
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dependently in reliance upon the other, problems of divergence
would arise if each recorded or interpreted the data differently.
Such divergent expectations would exist, moreover, at both an
aggregate and a disaggregate level.
In principle, manufacturers could have taken the initiative
and effected convergent expectations by contract. Coordination by
contract is costly, however, where the two parties are bargaining in
an unfamiliar situation and the hazards of contracting are great.
The hazards to which I refer have been discussed elsewhere in the
context of idiosyncratic exchange.7 4 Such problems arise when in-
vestments in specialized human and/or physical assets are required
in order that the transaction be completed in an economical way.
With respect to the issues of concern to Chandler, the problems
were especially severe when the mass production and sale of con-
sumer or producer durables was contemplated. Distributors here
would have to be induced to make specialized (product- and brand-
specific) investments and, once made, manufacturers and distribu-
tors would thereafter often be dealing with each other in what,
essentially, was a bilateral exchange arrangement 5  Given the
hazards of opportunism that arise in such circumstances, both par-
ties were reluctant to rely on autonomous contracting to accom-
plish the investments and govern a continuing exchange relation.
Forward integration by manufacturers into distribution was
the organizational response to these contracting difficulties. Not
only were profits realized in the process, but social cost savings re-
sulted. Absent reasons to believe otherwise, net social as well as
net private gains accrue when such organizational innovations
appear.
B. Strategic Behavior and Forward Integration
1. Chandler's Findings
Chandler assigns long-lasting entry consequences to the for-
ward integration decisions of American manufacturers described
above. Thus he observes:
The administrative networks built to integrate the new
processes of production and distribution gave the pioneer-
74 0. W ALMSON, supra note 7, at 60-64; Wachter & Williamson, Obligational
Markets and the Mechanics of Inflation, 9 BELL J. Ecom. 549, 556-57 (1978).
75 See 0. WiL.AMSON, supra note 7, at 89-95.
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ing enterprises their greatest competitive advantage. Al-
though capital intensive in terms of the ratio of capital to
labor inputs, the new machinery was not that expensive.
The absolute cost of entry [into manufacturing] was not
high, nor in most industries were patents a barrier to
entry ....
The most imposing barrier to entry in these indus-
tries was the organization the pioneers had built to mar-
ket and distribute their newly mass-produced products. A
competitor who acquired the technology had to create a
national and often a global organization of managers,
buyers, and salesmen if he was to get the business away
from the one or two enterprises that already stood astride
the major marketing channels. Moreover, where the pio-
neer could finance the building of the first of these organi-
zations out of cash flow, generated by high volume, the
newcomer had to set up a competing network before high-
volume output reduced unit costs and created a sizeable
cash flow.76
2. A Transaction Cost Interpretation
Four things are noteworthy about Chandler's conclusions.
First, entry barriers of the conventional kinds were not, in his judg-
ment, significant. Second, the main barriers were attributable to
the linking of manufacturing with distribution. Third, late en-
trants were at a disadvantage with respect to early entrants not be-
cause the latter were able to avoid costs but because of the differ-
ential cost-bearing consequences of later entry. This is precisely
the matter of temporal cost differences discussed above.77 Finally,
although the linking of manufacturing and distribution arguably
had strategic consequences, the original decisions to integrate were
not motivated by a strategic purpose. Rather, the resulting entry
effects appear to be unintended spillovers.
Such unintended spillovers should be contrasted with predatory
pricing or predatory investment, in which a punitive or preemptive
76 A. CA=Lmm , supra note 63, at 298-99.
77 See text accompanying notes 34-56 supra.
The essence of Chandler's argument is that a "first mover" advantage can affect
the conditions of entrance later faced by others. A general discussion of this
phenomenon can be found in my book Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and
Antitrust Implications. 0. WHLImsox, supra note 7, at 34-35.
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purpose is clear and an antitrust issue is sharply posed. Should the
consequences of benign historical decisions also come under anti-
trust scrutiny? In addition, should antitrust law attempt to effect
remedies for such consequences?
As to the first question, it seems clear that any development,
historical or otherwise, that contributes significantly to the creation
of durable dominant firms or collusive oligopolies should be iden-
tified and analyzed-lest it be unnecessarily repeated. But whether
the law should attempt to undo unwanted outcomes that are at-
tributable to once-lawful responses to business opportunities is a
more difficult matter. This problem involves a tension between
two fundamental values.
The affirmative case for legal intervention is based on the
premise that, except when lawful patents are involved or when
intervention would result in diseconomies, durable monopoly power
of any kind results in direct and indirect economic losses. The
direct losses include simple allocative efficiency decrements, due to
the excesses of prices over costs, and the reduced vigor of intra-
industry rivalry (which may impair both process and product in-
novation). Indirect losses are of an intergenerational kind, in which
later generations find that opportunity sets are sharply circumscribed
by earlier events.
The opposing argument is that penalizing winners is contrary
to the spirit of an enterprise system and will impair incentives to
innovate. Presumably, however, the strength of these arguments
weakens as the period over which monopolistic results remain un-
challenged lengthens. Whether the gains from intervention exceed
the losses after only five years of uncontested dominance is perhaps
doubtful. But indefinite insularity is not obviously optimal.
Twelve to fifteen years of unchallenged dominance might well be
reasonable, 78 though even this is subject to dispute. Dominant
firm outcomes simply pose an unhappy public policy dilemma-a
dilemma which is made more acute when such outcomes are at-
tributable to preemptive signaling and investment.7 9
78 At a discount rate of 15 percent, the discounted values of a dollar earned
12 or 15 years in the future are 19 and 12 cents, respectively. At a twenty percent
discount rate, the corresponding present values drop to 11 and 7 cents. The present
value of a project that earns K dollars per year in perpetuity is 7.1K if discounted
at fifteen percent and 5.5K if discounted at twenty percent. Eighty percent of these
values are realized during the first 112' and 9 years, respectively. Claims that invest-
ment incentives are sharply curtailed if monopoly outcomes are, at some point,
subject to challenge should come to terms with this arithmetic.
79 See Spence, Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market, 10 BELL
J. EcoN. - (1979).
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IV. A TRANSACTION COST CRITIQUE
OF THE Schwinn DECISION
The law of vertical restrictions appears to be tentative and
unsettled.80 Its protean character is apparent in the Supreme
Court's inconsistent application of legal principles and standards in
three cases: White Motor Co. v. United States,81 United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,8 2 and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc. 3 Of these, Schwinn best reflects the hazards of ground-
ing legal decisions in defective economic reasoning. Although
Sylvania made progress toward remedying some of the mischief
created by Schwinn, I believe further progress can be made if the
transaction cost attributes of vertical restriction cases are developed.
The transaction cost approach to antitrust issues applies broadly,84
and powerfully illuminates matters relating to vertical integration
and vertical restraints.8 5 With the expectation that systematic criti-
cism of past mistakes aids the process of creating better antitrust
law, in this section I will discuss the efficiency and strategic aspects
of vertical restraints like those found in Schwinn. One of the rea-
sons why inhospitable economic reasoning of the kind that prevailed
in Schwinn has since been discredited is the growing realization that
transaction cost issues that were suppressed then are central-both to
Schwinn and to a broader understanding of economic organization.
A. Transaction Cost Efficiencies
Suppose that a producer has a distinctive good or service and
perceives that the public, or some part thereof, will be prepared to
purchase it, possibly by paying a premium above the price of sub-
stitutes, if the producer can (1) create recognition for the attributes
that distinguish the item, (2) maintain quality control with respect
to these attributes, and (3) maintain cost control such that the price
at which the product will recover its full costs is not prohibitive.
80 See Bork, supra note 29, at 171; Goldberg, The Law and Economics of
Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective (1978) (unpublished paper on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
81372 U.S. 253 (1963).
82388 U.S. 253 (1967).
83433 U.S. 36 (1977).
84 See Transaction Cost Considerations, supra note 5, at 1439.
85 D. TEECE, supra note 66, at 7-25; Liebeler, Integration and Competition, in
VETincAL INTEm~cBroN Inr = Or. INDusTY (E. Mitchell ed. 1976); Phillips,
supra note 2. Phenomena that other approaches regard with puzzlement, or even
hostility, fall naturally into place when vertical relations issues are cast in contracting
terms and the properties of alternative contracting modes are examined with respect
to their transaction cost attributes.
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Specifically, assume that the distinctive item in question is a bicycle,
that distinctiveness takes the form of quality and service, and that
the brand name of the bicycle is Schwinn.
If customers were fully knowledgeable or could be apprised
without cost of all relevant attributes of all products, Schwinn could
simply announce that it was supplying a bicycle that had these prop-
erties, the announcement would be registered among potential
buyers, customers could verify that these conditions existed (though
verification is a redundant operation in a world of complete knowl-
edge), and those who valued the attributes could judge whether the
premium was justified. Product differentiation in a world of un-
bounded rationality would thus proceed in a smooth and faultless
manner.
Consumers, however, do not have these high-powered attrib-
utes: their capacity to receive, store, recover, and process informa-
tion is limited. In the light of these limitations, not only does
Schwinn face the problem of transmitting its distinctive qualities,
but it faces the problem of having its image believed. Thus, if
consumers are occasionally misled, in that they are sometimes told
one thing and learn to their dismay that it is incorrect, and if
instances of fraud or deception are not known without cost to other
potential buyers, so that reputations are not instantly and accu-
rately updated, consumers will be wary when sellers apprise them
that their brand has "superior" qualities.
In a market of boundedly rational consumers, Schwinn is faced
with three interrelated information problems. First, it needs to
bring to the attention of consumers the distinctive attributes that
it purports to supply. Second, it needs to provide an institutional
infrastructure that will prevent these attributes from being de-
graded. Third, it needs to accomplish both of these goals in an
economical fashion.
Assume that it is uneconomical for Schwinn to mount a mas-
sive advertising campaign in which to proclaim the superiority of
its product. In addition, assume that, because quality and service
are related attributes, Schwinn determines that the most effective
way to accomplish its product differentiation objectives is to dis-
tribute through authorized dealers who agree, as a condition of
franchising, to provide specified minimum services (advertising,
assembly, maintaining a stock of bicycles and replacement parts,
providing qualified repair personnel, and the like). Inasmuch as
these services are costly to provide, Schwinn bicycles sold and serv-
iced by authorized dealers will be priced at a premium, other things
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being equal.86 Assume further that Schwinn's product differentia-
tion efforts will be vitiated if this set of minimum services is not
reliably provided.87 Assume finally that Schwinn's franchise pro-
gram is successful in that, with appropriate franchisee constraints,
the image appeals to a sufficient number of customers to make it
viable.
Several economic questions now arise. First, which customers
will be attracted by such an image? Second, why might Schwinn
want to prevent nonfranchised sales? Third, will Schwinn inte-
grate forward into retailing if vertical restraints are not permitted?
Each of these poses transaction cost issues.
With respect to customer appeal, the buyers that will be at-
tracted by Schwinn will presumably be those for whom the oppor-
tunity cost of time is great or who are relatively inept at self-assem-
bly and service. Thus, high-priced lawyers and other consultants
who bill clients on an hourly basis will pay several times the going
rate for a haircut, by patronizing barber shops that cut hair by
appointment, rather than joining the queue at a wait-your-turn
establishment.88 The argument generalizes to the procurement of
consumer durables. Time is economized if the customer does not
have to search for a brand possessing the requisite properties and is
easily able to locate and visit an outlet where the brand is stocked.
And additional time is saved if the item comes pre-assembled, is
reasonably trouble-free, and is reliably serviced at convenient
outlets.
Such a brand of bicycle will also be attractive to customers who,
though their unit opportunity cost of time may be below average,
are particularly inept at self-assembly and repairs. In this situa-
tion, despite low unit costs, the total opportunity cost is great-
because this is the product of unit cost and time expended. Thus,
two classes of customers will respond positively to the Schwinn
image: those who are inept and those who, although capable, have
a high per-unit opportunity cost of time.
This merely establishes, however, that franchised sales of
Schwinn bicycles will appeal to some customers. It does not reach
the question whether Schwinn should sell to all comers, allowing
dealers to determine whether or not to offer the set of services that
86 Furthermore, the premium will also increase to the extent that Schwinn incurs
additional expense at the manufacturing stage in order to accomplish its quality
objectives.
87 Possible causes of this problem are discussed below.
88 See Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 EcoN. J. 493 (1965).
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would qualify them as franchisees. Were Schwinn to do this, cus-
tomers who have the above-described attributes would presumably
go to the franchised outlet; those who do not could go elsewhere.
Because in a world of unbounded rationality more degrees of free-
dom-in this instance, more methods of merchandising--are neces-
sarily better than less, the natural policy inclination would be to
let consumers decide the question for themselves.
Several justifications, however, can be articulated in support of
franchise restrictions: first, the Schwinn quality image may be de-
based without sales restraints; second, even if quality images are
not impaired, the viability of franchises may hinge on sales re-
straints; third, the costs of enforcing the distribution contracts are
increased in a mixed distribution system.89 The quality image of
Schwinn turns partly on objective considerations: Schwinn bicycles
bought from authorized dealers come with an assured set of sales and
service attributes. But the image may also be affected by information
exchanged by word of mouth. If potential customers are told, "I
bought a Schwinn bike and it was a lemon," but are not advised
that the bicycle was bought from a discount house and was mis-
assembled, and that Schwinn's guarantees were thereby vitiated,
customer confidence in Schwinn is easily impaired. Put differently,
quality reputation may be preserved only if goods and services are
sold under conditions of constraint.90 Note in this connection that
the incentive to invest in commercial reputation, by surrounding
transactions with institutional infrastructure, occurs only in a world
of bounded rationality.91
8s Although arguably not applicable to the Schwinn case, a fourth justification
can be based on unfair allocation of demonstration costs: customers might shop for
Schwinn bicycles at the franchised dealer-deciding on what model, features, etc.,
to buy-and then make their purchase at the discount house, where the costs of
demonstration are largely avoided. This may be a more serious concern when more
expensive items, such as automobiles, are being marketed.
90 The fact that twenty percent of Schwinn's authorized sales were made by out-
lets-B.F. Goodrich, hardware and department stores-which did not provide service
might be taken as "proof" that the above hazard is insubstantial. See Brief for the
United States at 43-44, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967). But there are three mitigating considerations: (1) while twenty percent
nonserviced sales may be permissible, forty percent may not be; (2) the outlets
described have reputation attributes rather different from discount houses, and
hence may "stand behind" sales more completely; and (3) business judgment on
such matters is entitled to a certain degree of undisputed respect.
91 True attributes are presumably known or can be ascertained without cost in
a world of unbounded rationality. If this boggles the mind, the reader is encour-
aged to examine the once-for-all time-cum-environmental bidding procedures in
J.E. Meade's The Controlled Economy. J.E. MEADE, ThE CoRroLrmD EcoNomy
(1971).
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Even if the quality image of franchise sales is unimpaired by
nonfranchise selling, the commercial viability of franchisees,
which hinges on volume considerations, should be examined. Sup-
pose that it is determined that a franchised dealer needs to sell a
minimum number of bicycles in order to break even. Suppose fur-
ther that Schwinn carefully locates its franchisees cognizant of these
break-even needs.92  Finally, suppose that the system is initially
viable but that discount sales subsequently appear. Marginal fran-
chise operators shortly thereafter become nonviable. As a conse-
quence, the assurance of convenient Schwinn service outlets is
jeopardized. Customer interest declines and other viable franchisees
become marginal. This deterioration, taken together with the im-
paired quality image described above, creates the risk that the
franchise mode will become nonviable, and customers for whom
such differentiation yields net gains will be able to deal only in
the undifferentiated market.
The third justification for franchise restrictions involves polic-
ing costs. The argument here is that it is less costly to police simple
systems than it is to police more complicated ones. Causality (re-
sponsibility) is difficult to trace (attribute) in complex systems. If
few "excuses" can be offered, fewer veracity checks have to be made.
Although I do not suggest that this was a major consideration for
Schwinn, it could be relevant to the design of other marketing sys-
tems. Again this is a problem only in a world of bounded ration-
ality, because frictionless systems are self-policing.
Consider finally whether Schwinn will integrate forward into
retailing if restrictions on sales to nonfranchised outlets are pro-
hibited. If Schwinn's costs of integrated sales were identical with
those of its franchisees, this presumably would occur. There are
several reasons, however, to believe the case to be otherwise. First,
franchised dealers were not exclusively engaged in the sales and
service of Schwinn bicycles; other brands were also handled.93 Also,
many franchisees engaged in nonbicycle sales. Assuming that
multiple brand and multiple product sales are necessary for dis-
tributors to break even, forward integration would require Schwinn
92 This is altogether to be expected. Franchisors will ordinarily auction off
franchise locations where greater than competitive returns are expected unless such
auctions are costly to run.
93 Schwinn required its franchisees to display Schwinn bicycles "with position
equal to and as prominent as that of any competitive bicycle." Brief for Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., Appendix 1, at 57 n.89, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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to engage in unwanted and possibly unavailable sales activities. 4
Diversification into other products with which Schwinn had no
expertise or familiarity is the unwanted activity. Stocking other
brands, moreover, might pose difficulties of availability, as other
bicycle manufacturers might suspect, with cause, that their brands
would be slighted and demeaned if sold by Schwinn employees.
Furthermore, even if disabilities of these kinds did not exist,
the question still remains whether Schwinn could provide incen-
tives for managers of integrated sales outlets that prompt perform-
ance equal to that when franchising is used. Both carrot and stick
considerations must be addressed. The incentive disabilities asso-
ciated with bureaucratic modes of organization 95 stand as a further
impediment to forward integration by Schwinn.
The upshot is that if the worst consequences obtain (namely
that the franchise system collapses, Schwinn is unable to integrate
forward economically, and the Schwinn brand image vanishes),
prohibiting franchise restraints gives rise to real economic losses of
the kind shown in Figure 2. The demand curve for Schwinn
bicycles is here given by p, = g(q , ;p.1), where -i is the price at
which other bicycles sell (which is taken as given). The curve
ACI is the average cost of sales and service for franchised outlets.
As drawn, franchising just breaks even (covers all of its costs, in-
cluding a fair rate of return) at a price and quantity of p,*, q2, *, re-
spectively. Assuming that the costs of supplying nondifferentiated
bicycles are not increased by Schwinn franchising, the net welfare
gains (losses) realized by offering (withdrawing) the Schwinn brand
will be given by the shaded consumer surplus region.
B. The Absence of Strategic Effects
Having established the transaction cost efficiencies that may be
derived from a restrictive franchise arrangement, the next step of
the analysis involves an inquiry whether the franchise system pro-
motes anticompetitive effects. Specifically the question is whether
Schwinn, by itself or in conjunction with other large bicycle manu-
facturers, introduced vertical restraints that placed rivals or cus-
94 Alternatively, Schwinn could run the distribution stage at a loss. However,
it is doubtful that profits from manufacturing would be sufficient to cover these
losses. See text accompanying notes 15-26 supra. For a discussion of the disin-
centives to integrate forward into distribution, see Preston, Restrictive Distribution
Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 L. & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 506, 512 (1965).
9 5 See 0. WLLIAMsoN, supra note 7, at 118-29.
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tomers at a strategic disadvantage. 96 The government plainly re-
garded these restraints as anticompetitive and its jurisdictional
statement advanced the following theory of the case:
In industries in which products are highly differentiated,
a particular brand - like Schwinn bicycles - often has a
market of its own, within which [intrabrand] competi-
tion is highly important to the consumer and should be
96 The Supreme Court recognized the relevancy of such an inquiry in White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) ("economic and business
stuff" out of which restraints arose and their "actual impact" are relevant to deter-
mining the existence of an antitrust violation).
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preserved .... Schwinn's strenuous efforts to exclude un-
authorized retailers from selling its bicycles suggest that,
absent these restraints, there would be a broader retail
distribution of these goods with the resulting public bene-
fits (including lower price) of retail competition.
97
Similar views were repeated in the government's brief:
The premise of the Schwinn franchising program is that
Schwinn is a distinctive brand which commands a pre-
mium price - that it enjoys, in other words, a margin of
protection from the competition of other brands. To the
extent that this premise is sound, it is clear that the only
fully effective control upon the retail price of Schwinn
bicycles is that imposed by competition among Schwinn
dealers and distributors."
The government also disclosed the animosity with which it regarded
product differentiation:
Either the Schwinn bicycle is in fact a superior product
for which the consumer would willingly pay more, in which
event it should be unnecessary to create a quality image
by the artificial device of discouraging competition in the
price of distributing the product; or it is not of premium
quality, and the consumer is being deceived into believ-
ing that it is by its high and uniform retail price. In
neither event would the manufacturer's private interest in
maintaining a high-price image justify the serious impair-
ment on competition that results.99
And the government expressed its view about the merits of vertical
integration as compared with vertical restraints:
Even if the threat to integrate were not wholly lacking
in credibility in the circumstances of this case, we would
urge that it was not a proper defense to the restraint of
trade charge. In the first place, a rule that treats manufac-
turers who assume the distribution function themselves
more leniently than those who impose restraints on inde-
pendent distributors merely reflects the fact that, although
integration in distribution may sometimes benefit the econ-
97 Jurisdictional Statement for the United States at 14, United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
98 Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
99id. 47.
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omy by leading to cost savings, agreements to maintain
resale prices or to impose territorial restrictions of un-
limited duration or outlet limitations of the type in-
volved here have never been shown to produce comparable
economies. 00
The government's views on product differentiation and fran-
chise restraints thus can be reduced to the following three proposi-
tions: (1) differentiated products can be classed as those for which
a price premium is warranted and those for which such a premium
is not; (2) whether differentiation is real or contrived, intrabrand
price competition is essential to the protection of consumer inter-
ests; and (3) although vertical integration sometimes yields econ-
omies, the same cannot be said for vertical restraints. Each of these
premises is significantly flawed and for that reason the government's
anticompetitive effect argument should have failed.' 0'
The government's first premise, that it is "unnecessary to create
quality images" for products that are objectively superior to those
of rivals, depends upon an assumption of unbounded rationality.
Plainly, however, customers are not endowed with perfect cogni-
tive processes. Accordingly, efforts to "assist" customers and
thereby economize on bounded rationality, have merit. Reliability
images serve this purpose. Inasmuch as the Schwinn franchising
program did not entail exclusive dealing, neither actual rivals nor
potential rivals could be said to have experienced any adverse ef-
fects. Suppose, however, for purposes of argument, that exclu-
sivity had been involved. The matter of anticompetitive effect
then turns on Schwinn's market share and the conditions of entry.
The government's brief, however, is devoid of any attention to
market structure.
100 Id. 50.
'o Posner, who "briefed and argued the Schwinn case for the government,"
contends that his analysis of the issues at that time "reflected the then prevailing
thinking of the economics profession on restricted distribution." Posner, supra note
57, at 3. Although I agree that there was (and is) economic thinking congenial to
the views set out in the Schwinn brief, I would hesitate to characterize it as that
of the economics profession. Inasmuch as the brief is inexplicit about the sources
of its economic reasoning (Preston's is the only economics article dealing with
vertical restraints that is cited in the brief, Brief for the United States at 49, United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and Preston expressly dis-
cusses a series of legitimate economic purposes that can be served by vertical
restraints, see Preston, supra note 53, at 507-19), because Telser's work on the
rationality of restraints was in the public domain at that time, see Telser, supra
note 26; Telser, Abusive Trade Practices: An Economic Analysis, 30 L. & CoNTrUsP.
PnoB. 488 (1965), and because I expressly took exception with the brief while it
was in preparation, Posner's attribution may sweep too broadly.
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The simple facts are these: Schwinn's market share, which had
been twenty-two percent in 1951, the year before it introduced its
disputed marketing program, fell steadily in the decade that fol-
lowed, dropping to thirteen percent in 1961 .102 Schwinn plainly
was not a dominant firm at any time during this interval.
What then of the possible existence of a tight oligopoly in
which the main firms all employed exclusive franchising? Although
concentration in the bicycle industry was in the high-moderate
range in 1951, the four firm concentration ratio then being sixty-
three percent, the decade following was one of intense competition.
Foreign imports, which accounted for eight percent of the market
in 1951, rose to a high of forty percent in 1955. The escape clause
to the GATT agreements was invoked in August, 1955,103 and
bicycle imports thereafter dropped-remaining in the neighborhood
of thirty percent in the years that followed.
104
Not only did the market share of the four largest firms fall
sharply over this interval, but there was considerable shifting of
market shares among them. Schwinn, which was the largest firm
with twenty-two percent of the market in 1951, dropped to second
place with thirteen percent of the market in 1961. AMF, the sec-
ond place firm in 1951 with sixteen percent of the market, dropped
to third with eight percent of the market in 1961. The third place
firm in 1951, Columbia, dropped to fifth place in 1961, the respec-
tive market shares being twelve and five percent. However,
0 2 The following table shows the market shares of the four largest firms and of
foreign imports in the bicycle industry during the period of 1951 to 1961:
Market Shares of Four Largest Domestic Producers and of
Foreign Imports, 1951-1961
Four Largest Foreign
Domestic Imports
Producers
1951 63 8
1953 52 22
1955 34 40
1957 46 28
1959 49 28
1961 49 30
Source: Brief for Arnold, Schwinn & Co., Appendix 1, at 8, n.21, United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
103 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XIX, 61 Stat.
pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700. The escape clause was invoked by the United
States on August 19, 1955, to raise the rate of duties on bicycles imported into the
United States. GATT Doc. L/433 (1955), reported in GENERA AGREEMENT ON
TmuFFs AND TRADE, ANALncAL INDEx 104 (2d rev. 1966).
104 Brief for Arnold, Schwinn & Co., at 5 n.15, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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Murray, the fourth place firm in 1951, jumped from a twelve per-
cent position to a twenty-two percent position in 1961, taking over
first place in the process.10 5 Four established bicycle producers
were acquired during the decade, two of them by AMF, a large,
diversified producer of consumer and industrial products.106 The
record thus discloses active competition among extant domestic
producers and with foreign rivals.
Finally, the government's third premise that intrafirm restraints
(vertical integration) are less objectionable than interfirm restraints,
because vertical integration often yields offsetting economies that
do not accrue when interfirm relations are restrained, is simply
naive. As developed above, 07 vertical market restrictions in this
and other markets can often yield economies. Furthermore, ver-
tical integration is not a cost panacea. l'0 The hostility of the gov-
ernment to interfirm trading restrictions reflects a bias in favor of
bureaucratic, as opposed to market, modes of organization that is
not only unwarranted but inimical to social welfare.
In summary, the franchise restrictions which Schwinn intro-
duced not only had a plausible efficiency justification, but, in addi-
tion, no anticompetitive effects could possibly be attributed to them.
They were not part of an exclusive dealing program; Schwinn's
market share was too small, by itself, to warrant antitrust concern
even if exclusivity had been involved; rivals did not engage in
franchising, much less exclusive dealing; and the bicycle market
was characterized by active competition. Where actual competition
is and arguably will continue to be effective, concern over poten-
tial competition is misplaced. The government's case against
Schwinn was wholly fanciful.
V. APPROACHES ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRANSACTION
COST APPROACH
With the exception of the inhospitability tradition referred to
above, the leading alternatives to the transaction cost approach are
partly or mainly complementary to it. None, however, deals as
comprehensively with the central issues posed by vertical restric-
tions, and hence none is an adequate substitute.
10 5 See note 102 supra.
106 Brief for Arnold, Schwinn & Co., at 2 n.5, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
107 See text accompanying notes 12-30 & 86-94 supra.
1 08 See 0. W=LLAMSON, supra note 7, at 82-131.
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A. The Inhospitability Tradition
Proponents of the inhospitability tradition eschew reliance on
common law reasoning and emphasize real or imagined effects in-
stead. 10 9 Not only is there no presumption that business practices
are ordinarily motivated by efficiency purposes, but this possibility
is not even actively considered. Instead, attention is focused on the
possibility that some anticompetitive effect, however remote, might
be connected with the practice in question. This type of orienta-
tion and reasoning is hostile to an enterprise mode of organization
and commonly results in bad public policy arguments and out-
comes.110
B. The Populist Approach
The populist approach favors attention to fairness and relies
little on economic analysis. Some of those who advocate the popu-
list approach seem to regard economic analysis as not merely un-
helpful but ill-advised. Thus the populist approach has been
characterized by Professor Sullivan as one that regards allocative effi-
ciency as "useless as a guide to antitrust policy." 111 Values other
than efficiency are instead assigned a decisive role:
During the eighty-odd years that antitrust has been with
us, there have been ebbs and flows of interest in enforce-
ment, all correlated with other developments in national
life. The values which, until very recently, have shown
themselves most strongly in the expression of policy have
been populist in origin, and have had such aims as the
transfer of wealth and power from industrial interests to
agrarian ones, the decentralization and dispersion of
economic and related political power, the preservation of
a commerce and industry open to entry by small entre-
preneurs, the reduction of prices, and the prohibition of
unfair competitive tactics."
2
Sullivan's argument against the use of partial equilibrium
welfare economics is that considerations of "second best" demon-
strate that efficiency claims are pointless." 3 The reduction of price
109 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 294 (1962).
1I Sullivan, Book Review, 75 CoLtum. L. REv. 1214 (1975).
112 Id.
113 Sullivan's premise is that "[tihe standard theoretical demonstration of the
allocative efficiency of a competitive market as contrasted to a monopolized market
• . . has no welfare implications except as part of a general equilibrium analysis."
Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1219 (footnote omitted). Thus, "[the theoretical
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distortions in one sector when they remain in others is "just as
likely to... make allocations worse-or to leave allocations as bad
as they are" as it is to yield an efficiency gain."--
Although this is a common interpretation of the second best
literature,115 it is not a correct one. To demonstrate that a local
correction can yield a global loss in the face of distortions elsewhere
is an existence argument. It says nothing about likelihood, which
is a much stronger statement. Sullivan's leap from an existence to
a likelihood claim is unwarranted. As Baumol points out, the
policy importance of second best qualifications turns on the strength
of interdependence: "[A] great many interrelationships within the
economy are weak enough to be ignored. Thus, for all practical
purposes, the demand for most goods is likely to be dependent only
on the demands for a few other items.... It may, then, be pos-
sible to partition the economy more effectively than some might
have suspected." 110 Strong interaction effects then can be taken
expressly into account, and elsewhere the second best qualification
deserves the weight that lawyers label "de minimis."
Additionally, Sullivan's comments appear to be restricted en-
tirely to price distortions (due to "monopolies, cartels, tariffs, and
distorting taxes" 117). But allocative inefficiency is more apt to
arise with respect to cost concerns, such as diseconomies of scale,
failure to operate assets in a least cost way, and the incurring of
conclusion that consumer welfare (as measured by the aggregate amounts consumers
will pay for goods and services) will be improved when a monopoly market is
converted (without loss of scale economies) into a competitive one is warranted
only if it is presupposed, first, that all other industries are already competitively
organized, and, second, that there exist no other deviations from optimality ......
Id. 1219. From this premise Sullivan reasons that
[a]bsent the simultaneous fulfillment of all conditions of optimum alloca-
tion... economic theory tells us nothing about how to improve resources
allocations .... Economics simply provides no basis on which to say,
for example, that ending monopoly in the shoe industry or ending a price
cartel in the electrical equipment industry (or doing both of these things)
will improve resource allocations and increase aggregate welfare. Given
the persistence of other deviations (other monopolies, cartels, tariffs, and
distorting taxes), there is no basis for assuming that doing away with any
one or more deviations from optimality would improve efficiency at all.
Id. 1220 (emphasis in original).
314 Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1220 (emphasis added).
115 As Bork notes, the theory of second best "does not address itself to the
probability of the bad result, but merely states it as a possible outcome." B. BonE,
supra note 34, at 113. Consequently, to take the "possibility of second best as
destroying the rationality of the consumer welfare basis of the law (which it does
not) and therefore freeing the courts to evolve new rules on other social and political
values . . .is little short of preposterous." Id. 114.
116 Baumol, Informed Judgment, Rigorous Theory and Public Policy, 32 S.
EcoN. J. 137, 144 (1965).
117 Zeekhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives, 23 Put. PoL'Y 419, 446 (1975).
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significant transaction costs. Organizational changes that give rise
to cost savings in any of these respects will, if not accompanied by
offsetting price distortions, invariably yield social gains. Thus
Sullivan both overstates the weight to be assigned to second best
arguments in evaluating relative price distortions and makes no
allowance for allocative efficiency analysis in the matter of cost
savings.
A further problem with this approach is that it easily links
up with the inhospitability tradition, in which anticompetitive
purpose is found lurking behind every business initiative. The
populist approach has the advantage, however, of calling attention
to the merits of process in a way that other approaches do not. Al-
though this last is often disregarded, it is the distinctive strength
of the populist orientation. As Richard Zeckhauser observes in his
discussion of "The Importance of Process," "[m]any analysts dis-
miss too quickly the significance of having an equitable and widely
accepted process." 118 For many societal decisions, "the procedure
by which the decision is made may be as important as the actual
dollar numbers employed. . . . [Consequently] monies available
for other goods may give a wholly unrealistic impression of wel-
fare. How people feel about the society in which they are living
matters a tremendous amount." 119
To be sure, process values are not easily quantified and even
the qualitative aspect may be disputed. When one is close to the
margin, however, process considerations can frequently be used to
break ties. Moreover, in circumstances in which fairness is thought
to be a central issue, process values ought to be assigned even greater
weight. Lest arguments in favor of dispersed economic power be
used or manipulated irresponsibly, however, claims of this kind
ought to be reserved for circumstances in which they are plainly
important. Again, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States illustrates the
hazards of relying on such arguments when the facts of a case are
inapposite.1 20
C. The Structure-Conduct-Performance Approach
The structure-conduct-performance approach also comple-
ments the transaction cost approach. Recall that although the
transaction cost approach employs an efficiency presumption, this
Isd.
119 Id. 459.
120370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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can be rebutted by a showing of strategic purpose and effect. 12 ' The
latter showing requires a demonstration that the industry in ques-
tion is characterized by a dominant firm or collusive oligopoly.
This entails an examination of conventional structure and conduct
relations.
The preoccupation of the structure-conduct-performance para-
digm with technological features, however, has been self-limiting.
Vertical integration, which is principally a transaction cost phe-
nomenon, remained a puzzle for so long precisely because of this
technological orientation.122 For this reason, the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm served to reinforce the orientation of the
inhospitability tradition-because if transaction cost economies are
unimportant, the suspicion that novel business practices are mo-
tivated by anticompetitive purposes is easy, indeed natural, to
entertain. Recent contributions to this approach, 23 however, have
moved away from this technological orientation.
D. New Modeling Approaches
Opportunism was, until recently,24 mainly disregarded in for-
mal models of economic processes, but this has been changing. A
convergence between the transaction cost issues that I emphasize
and formal strategic analysis seems to be developing. How far this
convergence will go remains to be seen. My sense accords with
Simon, who argues that "qualitative institutional analysis, in which
discrete structural alternatives are compared" can frequently pro-
ceed by relying on "only rather modest and simple applications of
mathematical analysis." 125 At the same time, however, I am both
encouraged and greatly impressed by the quality of rigorous model-
ing that is being done on the matter of strategic behavior. Even
if formal analysis merely confirms qualitative institutional argu-
ments, it is useful to express the same arguments in different lan-
guages. And frequently I expect that formal models will yield
sharper and sometimes additional implications. 26
121 See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
122 See Liebeler, supra note 85.
123 See, e.g., Caves & Porter, supra note 48.
124 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
125 Simon, supra note 17, at 6-7.
126 See, e.g., Dixit & Norman, Advertising and Welfare, 9 BMuL. J. EcoN. 1
(1978); Nelson & Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting Concentration Under
Schumpeterian Competition, 9 BELL J. EcoN. 524 (1978); Schmalensee, Entry
Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. EcoN. 305
(1978).
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E. The Nonstrategic Tradition
What I refer to as the nonstrategic tradition is the important
stream of antitrust research that traces its origins to Aaron Director's
teaching and research at the University of Chicago. Prominent
examples are Bork and Bowman and, more recently, Posner. As
I have indicated elsewhere, antitrust specialists in law and eco-
nomics owe an everlasting debt to this tradition, which has insisted
that complex policy matters be assessed in a tough-minded eco-
nomic fashion in which the rudimentary issues are stated in stark
microeconomic terms. Logical errors of less rigorous antitrust rea-
soning have been exposed in the process and a deeper appreciation
for the economic benefits of purportedly anticompetitive practices
has been manifested.
The principal problems that I find in this approach are that
its proponents often disregard transaction costs and rarely con-
cede that strategic considerations sometimes operate. These are
clearly interrelated: if transaction costs are zero or negligible, strate-
gic intentions are beside the point, because they can have no effect,
and the simple microtheory model applies. Examples of this "fric-
tion-free" approach are Bowman's views on price discrimination127
and Bork's views on vertical market restrictions.128
With respect to price discrimination, the friction-free view is
that, perverse elasticity conditions excepted, allocative efficiency
gains will result if a monopolist is permitted to price discriminate. 2 9
The argument depends on the assumption that discrimination, in
whatever degree attempted, is costless to effectuate. Once allow-
ance is made for the transaction costs of discovering differential
valuations among customers and enforcing restrictions against re-
sale (so that there can be no arbitrage), however, this allocative
efficiency claim is much more problematical. 130 Simple sensitivity
to bounded rationality (which explains the inability of the mono-
polist to assess differing customer valuations without cost) and the
hazards of opportunism (whence the need to police against resale)
are the missing ingredients in the friction-free tradition.
The possibility that vertical restraints and strategic objectives
are linked is also resisted by the nonstrategic tradition.131 Although
12 7 See generally W. BowmAN, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMInC APPRAIsAL (1973).
128 R. Bonm, supra note 34, at 280-98.
129 See W. BowrA, supra note 127, at 111-13.
130 For an elaboration, see 0. WLMSON, supra note 7, at 113.
131 See text accompanying notes 34-44 supra.
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Bork acknowledges that exclusionary purposes occasionally operate,
his discussion of these matters reduces them to insignificance. 132 A
broader view in which transaction costs are expressly acknowledged
demonstrates that strategic behavior may occur in a wider range of
circumstances than his discussion discloses. If the logic of this
broader view is adopted-under which the possibilities of human
asset and capital market frictions of the kinds that I describe are
admitted-the question then is whether Bork's position on the law-
fulness of vertical restrictions ought to prevail because the frictions
that I describe are quantitatively unimportant and too insubstan-
tial to influence the enforcement of the law on vertical restrictions.
My response to this is as follows: (1) I have attempted to delimit the
objectionable subset of restrictive practices more carefully than
had been done previously; (2) as a consequence, Bork and I differ
in a serious way only with respect to the use of exclusive dealing in
dominant firm industries; (8) I am not persuaded that the effects of
the frictions that I discuss are insubstantial in this context, and
Chandler's historical survey suggests otherwise; and (4) until the
transaction cost attributes of these markets are studied more fully
and the basis for my concerns and Chandler's are expressly allayed,
the discriminating application of the law along the lines that I
propose is the prudent posture to take.
VI. CONCLUSION
Antitrust is an interdisciplinary field that is best served by
acknowledging that a deeper understanding of the issues will result
by addressing the subject from several points of view. The eco-
nomic approach that I favor, especially for dealing with vertical
market relations, is the transaction cost approach. The principal
points of this Article and the legal principles that result from the
systematic application of transaction cost analysis to vertical re-
straints are summarized below.
A. Economic Implications of the Transaction
Cost Approach
1. As with the integration of successive intermediate product
market stages, vertical restrictions between manufacturing and
distribution are primarily to be understood in transaction cost terms.
2. Despite striking similarities, there are also important dif-
ferences between these two types of vertical relationships. The dif-
132 R. BorK, supra note 34, at 320-24.
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ferences arise because the interests of final consumers as well as
those of distributors have to be considered in designing the inter-
face between manufacturing and distribution.
3. Contrary to the inhospitability tradition, contractual con-
straints can and often do serve legitimate economic purposes.
Specifically, vertical constraints may be needed lest subgoal pursuit
by the individual parts destroy the viability of the system.
4. Contrary to the inhospitability tradition, product differen-
tiation can and often does promote consumer welfare. The feasi-
bility of differentiation, moreover, may depend on the use of con-
straints at the manufacturer-distributor nexus.
5. The principal hazard that should concern the antitrust en-
forcement agencies in enforcing the law on vertical restrictions is
if restraints are introduced with the strategic purpose and effect of
disadvantaging rivals. Exclusive dealing restraints by dominant
firms or tight oligopolies can have this effect.
6. Economies defenses should be entertained before exclusive
dealing restrictions are prohibited.
7. Whether one is interested in assessing the vertical relations
that govern a specific interface, as in Schwinn, or in understanding
the historical evolution of vertical relations, such as the transforma-
tion that occurred in response to infrastructural changes late in the
nineteenth century, the same microanalytic approach in which
transaction costs are featured should apply.
That the errors that appeared in the government's jurisdic-
tional statement and brief in Schwinn are not repeated today sug-
gests to me that antitrust law has made real progress. I submit,
moreover, that this is partly because there is now a greater sensitiv-
ity to transaction cost considerations.1
33
B. Legal Implications of the Transaction
Cost Approach
Federal agencies charged with enforcing antitrust law should
rely on the foregoing economic principles when implementing en-
13 3 Turner and Posner were both instrumental in persuading the Supreme Court
to reverse itself in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Posner's reservations with the Schwinn doctrine appeared in 1977. See Posner,
supra note 57. Turner participated in an amicus brief with attorneys for the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association. The brief argues, among other things, the "the
'new economics of vertical relations' is increasingly illuminating the economies that
can be achieved by manufacturer influence on dealer practices." Motion for Leave
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forcement policy. Vertical market restrictions should be assumed
to be efficiency-enhancing unless specific structural characteristics
exist within the industry. Exclusive dealing is the only vertical
restraint posing the threat of strategic hazards. Absent the existence
of a dominant firm or a tight oligopoly within an industry,134 ver-
tical restrictions of all kinds, exclusive dealing included, should be
assumed to promote transaction costs economies.
When the industry is characterized by a dominant firm or
tight oligopoly, antitrust agencies and courts should subject exclu-
sive dealing constraints, but not other vertical restrictions, to close
scrutiny to ascertain whether they create barriers to entry. A firm
in such a situation should not be charged with nor found to have
committed an antitrust violation if it can affirmatively show that
nontrivial transaction cost economies are created by the vertical
restraint under scrutiny.
8 5
Finally, uniform reliance on vertical restrictions of any kind-
on price, territories, customers, or exclusive dealing-in industries
marked by tight oligopolies should be subject to close scrutiny to
determine whether the restriction regularizes trade and promotes
greater interdependence. Again, firms in such a situation should
not be charged with nor found to have committed an antitrust vio-
lation if they can affirmatively demonstrate that nontrivial trans-
action cost economies are achieved by the vertical restraint under
scrutiny.
to File Brief and Brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association as Amicus
Curiae, at 24, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(quoting Phillips, supra note 2, at 574) (footnote omitted).
134 See note 50 supra.
135 A rigorous demonstration of these economies is not apt to be feasible. But
more than a showing that some economies are plausibly realized should be required.
For a discussion of economies as an antitrust defense, see generally Williamson,
Economies Defense, supra note 5.
Note that Posner proposes an output test---"did the manufacturer's output in-
crease or decrease after imposing the restriction?"--to get at these issues. Posner,
supra note 57, at 19. (An equivalent test would be to examine the effect on price.)
Ordinarily, however, I would expect that output and price effects would be dis-
tributed over time and confounded by many other factors. The elaborate econo-
metric investigation that Posner contemplates to sort these out does not appear to
me to be feasible.
The basic issues, if exclusive dealing is to be prohibited, are what transaction
cost economies does exclusive dealing promote and whether the sacrifice of these
will be significant. These matters ought ordinarily to be amenable to examination
in qualitative and crude quantitative terms.
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